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Abstract
In a duopoly where two …rms’ products are di¤erentiated both, horizontally
and vertically, introduction of a quality standard a¤ects equilibrium quality
levels of both …rms. The e¤ects, furthermore, depend upon consumers being
or not perfectly informed about qualities. Qualities are strategic substitutes
and under perfect information only non-innocuous standards, i.e. above the
lowest quality in an unregulated equilibrium, change the equilibrium. However,
the average quality in the market may go down due to the standard, because
the high quality …rm will lower its own quality, and total consumers welfare
may decrease. Under uncertainty, even innocuous standards, below the lowest
unregulated equilibrium quality, may alter the equilibrium quality choices.
JEL: L0, L5
Keywords: Regulation, Minimum Quality Standards, Oligopoly, Product Dif-
ferentiation, Asymmetric Information
1. Introduction
The aim of this article1 is to explore the impact of Minimum Quality Standards on the
quality level chosen by …rms in oligopoly. The existing literature is based on models
of pure vertical di¤erentiation, following the work by Ronnen (1991), while I use a
model where products are di¤erentiated both, horizontally and vertically. A Minimum
Quality Standard obliges all …rms to set their vertical quality dimension above a
given threshold. The pure vertical di¤erentiation models for unregulated markets
pioneered by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), in the case of a duopoly, obtain equilibria
where …rms design products with maximum quality di¤erentiation. Qualities are, for
relevant ranges of parameters, strategic complements. Even under the assumption
that quality can be increased at no cost, one of the two …rms will produce a product
with the lowest possible quality. In such a scenario the possibility that regulatory
intervention improves upon the market outcome seems most likely. A summary of
the main results by Ronnen (1991), however, will help introduce the problems: (i)
Under pure vertical di¤erentiation,imposing an MQS that is intermediate between
the qualities of the two …rms will lead to higher qualities for both …rms and more
consumers entering the market (ii) provided the standard is not too high, the utility
of consumers is increased by the MQS, the high quality seller’s pro…t is decreased and
the low quality seller’s pro…t is increased. (iii) Finally, only if the standard is not too
high, total welfare is increased (Theorems 2 to 5 in Ronnen 1991). It is useful to stress
how the welfare results indicate that excessive standards may lead to lower welfare,
due to lower …rms’ pro…ts, while all consumers always gain by the introduction of a
standard. As expected, quality regulation mainly serves the interests of consumers.
The negative e¤ects on welfare are further stressed in Scarpa (1998), who intro-
duces a third …rm in the pure vertical di¤erentiation model. Then, quality may be a
strategic substitute for some …rms. Consumers, overall, gain by the imposition of a
MQS, although the pro…ts of all …rms decrease. Crampes and Hollander (1995) anal-
yses the case where variable costs depend upon the quality choice; they too …nd that
a mild standard, i.e. one that is not too high will increase both qualities and social
welfare, although the pro…ts of the high quality …rm are reduced. Consumers gains
are also obtained by Boom (1995), where standards are applied in an international
trade model with two countries. More recently, the pure vertical di¤erentiation model
has been used to study the possible manipulation of the regulatory agency’s choice by
leading …rms in an industry (Lutz et al. 2000), while Ecchia and Lambertini (1997),
analyzing the e¤ects of standards upon the incentives for collusion among …rms, …nd
that they are increased. Moraga-Gonzalez and Padron-Fumero (2002) use the model
of perfect vertical di¤erentiation to analyze anti-pollution emission standards. In their
model consumers’ preferences are such that lower emissions are translated in higher
individual utility from consumption of a unit of the good. A standard reduces per-
unit emissions, increases price competition, and more production after the standard
may lead to more pollution overall.
1 I thank the Department of Economics of the University of Crete for providing support to this
research, funded by the European Commission Individual Marie Curie Research Fellowship scheme
N. 2002-00153. I thank Emmanouil Petrakis for helpful comments.
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In the present paper I assume that products are di¤erentiated not only vertically,
but also horizontally, as when design and other features matter for consumers, or when
consumers di¤er in their preferences upon brand names. The model is a modi…ed
Hotelling linear city of unit length, where two …rms are located at the two opposite
endpoints of the spectrum of horizontal characteristics. The vertical dimension is
represented by a one-to-one relation between a parameter, µi, and the gross consumers’
surplus from the purchase of product i. Following the literature, an increase in quality
is assumed to be costly in that it implies a …xed investment that is raising in function
of the quality produced. If …rms had identical costs of improving their quality they
would end up with identical qualities at equilibrium, producing a rather special case.
In order to get two di¤erent qualities it shall be assumed that …rms may di¤er in their
ability to obtain a quality improvement. The game played by the two …rms is the
following. At the …rst stage …rms simultaneously choose their vertical quality level
and incur the corresponding …xed cost. At the second stage …rms choose prices and
obtain their …nal payo¤s.
I shall consider two alternative scenarios, one of perfect information and one where
consumers receive an imperfect signal about the products’ qualities. In both scenarios
if the regulator chooses a level for an MQS, …rms make their quality choice knowing
the regulatory requirement. I shall consider MQS that are higher than both qualities,
intermediate between the quality levels of the two …rms, and lower than both qualities.
The latter type of MQS shall be de…ned an ”innocuous” MQS as one would expect it
to leave …rms’ choices una¤ected.
Under perfect information I take up the issues of quality determination and con-
sumers’ welfare. The results point to an even less satisfactory performance of MQS
regulation than that in pure vertical di¤erentiation. In particular, I show that where
…rms’ products are di¤erentiated both horizontally and vertically, then (i) an MQS
that is intermediate between the two qualities will not lead to higher qualities for both
…rms, and lead to a lowering of the quality for the high quality …rm, (ii) as a result
the average quality may go down for some parameter ranges. This is reminiscent of
particular results by Scarpa (1998) with three …rms. However, the result that no con-
sumer is harmed by MQS’s does not carry through as the consumers who purchase
the high quality prior to regulation su¤er a welfare loss. Total consumers’ surplus
may decrease due to the introduction of an MQS.
The reason of the lowering of quality by the high quality …rm is that qualities are
strategic substitutes in the present context.
Under consumers’ imperfect information, the analysis is more complex. Con-
sumers’ perceptions of qualities can be a¤ected by the presence of a standard. To
make the point I use two examples. In the …rst, …rm 2 is a new entrant and con-
sumers only have noisy signal about the quality of this …rm. In this simple set up,
the imposition of an ”innocuous” standard prevents consumers from believing hat
the quality of the entrant could fall below the standard and therefore the expected
quality is higher than without the standard, for whatever true underlying quality level
chosen by the entrant. Since qualities are strategic substitutes this leads to a lower
equilibrium value for the high quality and to a higher one for the low quality …rm.
Finally, I analyze the case of a duopoly without new entrants. There, an ”innocu-
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ous” standard can lead to an increase in both qualities when …rms have symmetric
costs and consumers are uncertain about the quality of both …rms. The causality
running from consumers’ expectations to …rms quality choices is again the force un-
derlying the quality changes. In some sense this may constitute a vindication of the
use of MQS under asymmetric information. The results, however still seem rather
special. In a companion paper (Garella and Petrakis forthcoming) we study sym-
metric uncertainty under a more general formulation and provide some more robust
results concerning this case. In the concluding section I shall comment on the use of
quality regulation under imperfect information and on the limits of the present paper
and of the existing literature.
2. Unregulated industry equilibrium
There are two …rms, indexed 1 and 2. Products are horizontally di¤erentiated and,
by hypothesis, the two …rms are located at the opposite endpoints of a Hotelling
linear city (Hotelling 1929). Each product is also characterized by a vertical quality
dimension, µ, which is the result of independent technological e¤orts by …rms towards
quality improvements. Firms are asymmetric, in the sense that …rm 1 is assumed to
be more e¢cient than …rm 2 in improving the vertical dimension of its quality. The
production cost for the quantity of output q1 for …rm 1 is C1(q1; µ1) = cq1 + µ
2
1=2,
where c > 0 is a constant marginal cost independent of µ. The cost for …rm 2 is
C2(q2; µ2) = cq2 + ®µ
2
2=2, where ® > 1 is a cost parameter that distinguishes …rm 2
from 1. As it appears from these cost functions, the quality µ only a¤ects …xed costs,
as in much of the existing literature.
Consumers have an address x 2 [0; 1], and the distribution of consumers is uniform
with unit density. When buying at location z, for z = 0; 1 a consumer bears a ’trans-
portation cost’, or a lower utility than if it was buying her own preferred brand This
cost is t jx¡ zj, where j¢j denotes absolute value and t is a parameter describing the
importance of horizontal dimension in the consumers’ utility function (the parameter
t is known as ”unit transportation cost” in the spatial interpretation of the model).
Then, given the prices p1 and p2, the utility derived from consumption of good 1 and
2 is assumed to be equal to, respectively,
u1(x; µ1) = v + µ1 ¡ tx¡ p1
u2(x; µ2) = v + µ2 ¡ t(1¡ x)¡ p2:
Firms compete in two stages: at the …rst stage they simultaneously choose their
quality levels µ1 and µ2, and pay the relative costs of achieving those qualities; at the
second and …nal stage …rms simultaneously choose their prices. It is also possible to
think of the µ0s as of improvements that …rms realize over a basic product.
For convenience it is assumed that t is high enough, or
Assumption 1. t > 2=9.
Furthermore, it shall be assumed that v is large enough so that the market is
always entirely served. In particular, the following assumption will guarantee also
that the market shares of the two …rms overlap at an equilibrium.
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Assumption 2. v > 2t+ c.
Solving the game by backward induction shall provide the desired results. First,
note that the consumer indi¤erent between buying at one or the other …rm has address
denoted ~x such that
~x(p1; p2) = max
½
0;min
½
1;
1
2
+
(p2 ¡ p1) + (µ1 ¡ µ2)
2t
¾¾
:
Accordingly, the demand functions at the second stage of the game are de…ned as
D1(p1; p2; µ1; µ2) = ~x and D2(p1; p2; µ1; µ2) = 1¡ ~x. Then, when ~x(p1; p2) is not equal
to either 0 or 1, the pro…t maximization problem for …rm 1 at the second stage can
be written as
max
p1
(p1 ¡ c)
·
1
2
+
(p2 ¡ p1) + (µ1 ¡ µ2)
2t
¸
¡ µ
2
1
2
:
This provides the best reply function for …rm 1 at the second stage
·p1(p2) =
p2
2
+
(µ1 ¡ µ2) + t+ c
2
:
Similarly one gets the best reply for …rm 2 as
·p2(p1) = max
½
p1
2
+
(µ2 ¡ µ1) + t+ c
2
; 0
¾
:
p1
p2
0 p01
p02
Figure 1: price best replies
De…ne p01 as the intercept of the best reply function for …rm 1, namely p
0
1 =
(µ1¡µ2)+t+c
2 (respectively, p
0
2 =
(µ2¡µ1)+t+c
2 as the intercept for ·p2(p1)). Notice that
if ·p2(p01) · 0, then …rm 2 is priced out of the market because its quality is too low;
otherwise stated, the two best reply functions would cross at a value for p2 less than
or equal to zero. This obtains when
(µ1 ¡ µ2) + t+ c
4
¡ µ1 ¡ µ2
2
+
t+ c
2
· 0;
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or
µ2 · µ1 ¡ 3(t+ c) ´ µ02:
Then, if µ2 · µ02 the Nash prices are p¤2(µ1; µ2) = 0 and p¤1(µ1; µ2) = max
©
pm1 ; p
0
1
ª
,
where pm1 is the monopoly price for …rm 1, or p
m
1 = max
n
(v+µ1+c)
2 ; v + µ1 ¡ t
o
be-
cause at prices p1 lower than v+ µ1¡ t all consumers would buy from the monopolist
…rm 1. A similar reasoning goes for the case when the quality of …rm 1 is too low,
namely when µ1 · µ2 ¡ 3(t + c) ´ µ01. We shall exclude that either …rm uses a
quality so low as to be priced out, so that the analysis of the case where µ2 · µ02 (or
µ1 · µ01) shall not be further pursued. Obviously, this implies that the cost of quality
improvements cannot be too di¤erent, or that ® cannot be too much higher than 1.
Then, if µ2 > µ
0
2, the Nash prices at the second stage as functions of the values for
the µ0s are
p¤1(µ1; µ2) = t+ c+ (µ1 ¡ µ2)=3
p¤2(µ1; µ2) = t+ c¡ (µ1 ¡ µ2)=3:
Notice that p¤1(µ1; µ2)¡p¤2(µ1; µ2) = (2=3)(µ1¡µ2) is positive if the quality of …rm
1 is higher than that of …rm 2. The equilibrium demand functions are
D¤1(µ1; µ2) = (1=2) + (µ1 ¡ µ2)=(6t)
D¤2(µ1; µ2) = (1=2)¡ (µ1 ¡ µ2)=(6t).
The reduced form pro…ts, that shall be used to solve the …rst stage of the game,
are
¼¤1(µ1; µ2) =
n
[3t+ (µ1 ¡ µ2)]2
o
=(18t)¡ (µ1)2=2
¼¤2(µ1; µ2) =
n
[3t¡ (µ1 ¡ µ2)]2
o
=(18t)¡ ®(µ2)2=2
:
It is predictable that if the strict inequality ® > 1 holds, then at an equilibrium
…rm 1 will have a higher demand, a higher price, and a higher pro…t than …rm 2,
thanks to its lower cost of increasing the level of µ for its product. Now it is possible
to solve for the values of µ1 and µ2 at the …rst stage. Firm 1 and …rm 2 maximization
program at the …rst stage give the best reply functions
µ1(µ2) =
3t¡ µ2
9t¡ 1
µ2(µ1) = max
½
3t¡ µ1
9®t¡ 1 ; µ1 ¡ 3(t+ c)
¾
:
The two functions are represented in …gure 2 as two downward sloping straight lines
assuming t > 2=9. Vertical qualities are strategic substitutes. Note that …rm 2 cannot
choose a quality lower than µ1 ¡ 3(t + c) otherwise it is priced out of the market at
the second stage, this explains the V-shape of its best reply function. The same holds
true for …rm 1, although, for illustrative purposes, the …gure is drawn as if this …rm
were not concerned with being priced out. If the best reply functions cross where
they are both downward sloping then both …rms shall enjoy a positive market share
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at equilibrium, with positive prices (irrespective of pro…ts). One obtains, then, the
Nash equilibrium values for the qualities of the two …rms as,
µ¤1 =
9®t¡ 2
3(9®t¡ ®¡ 1)
µ¤2 =
9t¡ 2
3(9®t¡ ®¡ 1) :
In order to have µ¤2 > 0 it must be t > 2=9, as assumed, and 9®t¡®¡1 > 0 or ® >
1=(9t¡ 1) ´ ®(t). Let A(t) de…ne the set of values for ® such that ® ¸ max f1; ®(t)g;
then the following analysis proceeds upon the restriction that t > 2=9 and ® 2 A(t).
As expected, µ¤1 is not lower than µ
¤
2. Indeed µ
¤
1¡µ¤2 = 3t [(®¡ 1) = (9®t¡ ®¡ 1)] ¸ 0.
This situation is interesting for the following analysis of quality regulation. Note that
the parameter t, that is related to consumers’ attachment to their preferred quality
and that confers market power to …rms, also a¤ects the quality levels.
θ1
θ2
0
θ2(θ1)
θ1(θ2)
Figure 2: quality best replies.
Remark 1. Under A.1 and if ® 2 A(t), then 1 > µ¤1 ¸ µ¤2 > 0, with strict inequality
µ¤1 > µ
¤
2 if ® > 1.
Proof: Note that µ¤2 and µ
¤
1 belong to the open interval (0; 1) for t > 2=9. Indeed,
one has 3 (1¡ µ¤1) = (18®t ¡ 3® ¡ 1)= (9®t¡ ®¡ 1) and one can check that this
is positive for t = 2=9; furthermore, the …rst derivative of µ¤1 with respect to t is
negative2 for all values of t, the second derivative is positive, while limt!1 µ¤1 =
1=3. The derivative of µ¤2with respect to t is positive for all values of t and equal to
3(® ¡ 1)= (9®t¡ ®¡ 1)2, while the second derivative is negative, and limt!1 µ¤2 =
1=(3®).
2 Indeed d
dt
¡
9®t¡2
3(9®t¡®¡1)
¢
= 3® 1¡®
(9®t¡®¡1)2 .
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The equilibrium quality di¤erence is µ¤1 ¡ µ¤2 = 3t [(®¡ 1)=(9®t¡ ®¡ 1)]. The
derivative of µ¤1 ¡ µ¤2 with respect to t is obviously negative: if …rms have more
market power because consumers attach more and more importance to the horizontal
dimension (increases in t), …rms’ qualities become more and more alike. One can take
the limit of the equilibrium quality di¤erence for t going to in…nity, even if this makes
no economic sense because when t is above a threshold level …rms’ market shares are
identi…ed by non-overlapping intervals over [0; 1]. In any case, limt!1 (µ¤1 ¡ µ¤2) =
(®¡ 1)= (3®), so that the quality levels as functions of t never cross.
Prices and demands at equilibrium are
p¤1 = t+ c+
t(®¡ 1)
9®t¡ ®¡ 1 ; and p
¤
2 = t+ c¡
t(®¡ 1)
9®t¡ ®¡ 1
D¤1 =
1
2
·
1 +
®¡ 1
9®t¡ ®¡ 1
¸
; and D¤2 =
1
2
·
1¡ ®¡ 1
9®t¡ ®¡ 1
¸ ;
It is possible that if t is too high, then the market shares of the two …rms do not
overlap and they behave as separate monopolists. To exclude this possibility it is
assumed that even for consumer with address x = 0 one has u2 > 0 at an equilibrium,
so that consumers buy from …rm 1, eventually, because it gives a higher utility and
not because they have no positive utility from the alternative o¤ered by …rm 2. This
is true if the inequality v+ µ¤2 ¡ p¤2 > t holds. This is guaranteed by A.2, as it can be
easily checked3.
Further, it can be checked that D¤2 > 0 and that p¤2 > 0 for t > 2=9. Therefore,
under the assumption that t ¸ 2=9 the best reply function in qualities of the two
…rms cross where they are both downward sloping. The equilibrium demand for …rm
2, which can also be written as ®(9t¡ 2)=(9®t¡ ®¡ 1), is positive for ® 2 A(t).
The equilibrium pro…ts for the unregulated industry are,
¼u1 =
µ
9t¡ 1
18
¶µ
9®t¡ 2
9®t¡ ®¡ 1
¶2
and ¼u2 = ®
µ
9t¡ 1
18
¶µ
9t¡ 2
9®t¡ ®¡ 1
¶2
Under the assumptions that ® 2 A(t) and A.1 both pro…ts are nonnegative and that
of …rm 1 is always larger than that of …rm 2 in the case ® > 1.
3. Regulation via a Minimum Quality Standard
If there exist a regulating agency that imposes a MQS, denoted £, we can have
three di¤erent situations. (a) The …rst is when £ exceeds both quality levels in an
unregulated environment. (b) The second is when the standard is in between the
higher and the lower quality, (c) the third is when the standard is below both. Case
(a) is clearly a case where the e¤ect on qualities is easy to predict. So it seems for
case (c), that shall be termed the ”Innocuous Standard Case”. Case (b) is the one
3The desired inequality can be fully written as v + [(9t¡ 2)=(3T )]¡ 2t¡ c+ t [(®¡ 1)=T ] where
T = 9®t¡ ®¡ 1.
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on which the literature has so far concentrated and the one on which this section is
mainly devoted. We shall see in the section on asymmetric information that case (c)
is not obvious either.
It is unlikely that the regulatory agency be so informed about the …rms’ cost
functions as to choose the quality standard that maximizes social welfare under the
constraint that …rms choose their Nash equilibrium prices given the standard. More
likely is the case that the agency adopts some standard in response to concern by
consumers associations or public opinion in general. We shall analyze in turn the
three possible cases.
3.1. High standards
Case (a) is quite trivial: both …rms are obliged to raise their quality to the level
denoted, for ease of classi…cation, £a. Firms will sell the same quality: the standard
in this case eliminates the game in quality choices. The symmetric equilibrium price
shall be p = t+c, una¤ected by the particular quality standard chosen. This depends
crucially on the assumption that quality only a¤ects …xed costs. The consumers’
welfare is raised as far as the utility of a consumer depends positively on quality and
as far as the price of …rm 1 decreases, while the price of …rm 2 increases less than the
utility derived from the increase in quality: u2 = µ2 ¡ t(1¡ x)¡ t ¡ c¡ (µ1 ¡ µ2)=3
is increasing in µ2 and actually it raises to u2(£a) ´ £a ¡ t(1 ¡ x) ¡ t ¡ c, so that
the utility gain for any consumer who would be purchasing good 2 in an unregulated
industry is given by the positive amount (µ¤1 ¡ µ¤2)=3.
The price of …rm 2 is raised from p¤2 by the amount
t(®¡ 1)
9®t¡ ®¡ 1 .
The pro…ts of the two …rms will decrease as far as they end up on lower isopro…t
curves in the µ1 ¡ µ2 plane.
In particular, ¼2 (£a) = t=2¡ ®£2a is negative if £a >
p
t=(2®). It then follows,
Proposition 1. If the regulator sets a quality standard £a, such that µ¤1 < £a
<
p
t=(2®), then both qualities are raised and all consumers gain. The …rms’ pro…ts
are lower than without the standard. If the standard is such that £a >
p
t=(2®) then
…rm 2 will exit the market and …rm 1 remains a monopoly.
3.2. Intermediate standards
Turn now to Case (b). Let the standard be denoted by £b, where µ¤1 > £b > µ
¤
2. Since
…rm 2 must set its quality so that µ2 = £b, the reaction function of …rm 2 will exhibit
a ‡at segment in correspondence of £b. Firm 1, then, will choose according to its
own best reply function. The new Nash equilibrium point will be at the intersection
of the ‡at part of …rm 2’s reaction function with …rm 1’s reaction function. Denoting
by a superscript b the variables in a regulated environment in case b, it shall be
µb1 = µ1(£b) =
3t¡£b
9t¡ 1 and µ
b
2 = £b:
It is clear that:
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Proposition 2. If the regulator sets a standard £b such that µ¤1 > £b > µ
¤
2, then
the quality levels under the standard regulation, µb1; µ
b
2 are such that µ
¤
1 > µ
b
1 > £b =
µb2 > µ
¤
2; the high quality under the standard is lower than without it.
Then, the quality di¤erence is lowered to (µb1¡£b) = 3t1¡3£b9t¡1 and the correspond-
ing prices will be
pb1 = t+ c+ t ((1¡ 3£)=(9t¡ 1)) and pb2 = t+ c¡ t ((1¡ 3£)=(9t¡ 1)) ;
clearly, the price of …rm 1 goes down and that of …rm 2 goes up as the standard is
raised. The demand addressed to …rm 1 and 2 shall be respectively
Db1(µ
b
1; µ
b
2) =
1
2
µ
1 +
1¡ 3£
9t¡ 1
¶
and Db2(µ
b
1; µ
b
2) =
1
2
µ
1¡ 1¡ 3£
9t¡ 1
¶
.
The pro…ts of the two …rms shall be
¼b1(£) =
[3t¡£]2
2(9t¡ 1) ¡
£2
2
and ¼b2(£) = (t=2)
·
1¡ 1¡ 3£
9t¡ 1
¸2
¡ ®£
2
2
:
It is clear that the pro…t of …rm 1 will decrease after the imposition of the standard,
since it will choose a lower quality, corresponding to an isopro…t curve corresponding
to a lower value of pro…ts than the one reached at an unregulated equilibrium. On
the other hand, …rm 2 may gain from the imposition of a standard if this is not too
high with respect to its unrestricted equilibrium quality. In particular, one can make
reference to …gure 2 to see that the unrestricted equilibrium isopro…t curve for …rm
2 may lie below or above that obtained after the imposition of a standard, depend-
ing upon the standard position on the graph. Indeed one has that the derivative
(d¼2=d£) = t
³
9t¡2+3£
9t¡1
´³
3
9t¡1
´
¡ ®£ can be negative or positive.4
Remarkably, average quality in the market may go down. This is most likely when
the high quality has a high market share prior to the imposition of the standard.
Remark 2. When the standard £b is such that µ¤1 > £b > µ
¤
2; average quality with
the standard may be higher or lower than without.
Average quality is ¹£ =
h
Db1(µ
b
1; µ
b
2)
i³
3t¡£
9t¡1
´
+
h
Db2(µ
b
1; µ
b
2)
i
£b which is given by:
¹£ =
Ã
3
2
µ
3t¡£
9t¡ 1
¶2
+
£
2
µ
9t¡ 2 + 3£
9t¡ 1
¶!
And d¹£=d£b = (¡45t + 81t2 + 2 + 54£bt)=
h
2 (9t¡ 1)2
i
. This derivative is in-
creasing with the standard, so that when the regulator sets a standard that is close
4 If £ = µ¤2 this derivative is equal to
h
3t(9t¡2)
(9t¡1)2
i
+
³
t
(9t¡1)2
´³
9t¡ 2
(9®t¡ ®¡ 1)
´
¡
®
9t¡ 2
3(9®t¡ ®¡ 1)which can be positive for low values of ®.
10
enough to the low quality it is likely that the average quality decreases. Indeed
the numerator of d¹£=d£b is lowest when one takes £b equal to the minimum level
µ¤2 = (9t ¡ 2)= [3(9®t¡ ®¡ 1)]. For such a level, the numerator of d¹£=d£b can be
shown to be strictly negative for all values of ®, provided t > 1=9.
For instance, for t = 3=9 and ® = 2 one has that the unregulated qualities are
µ¤2 = 1=9 and µ
¤
1 = 4=9; then, suppose the regulator sets £ = 1=6 as an intermediate
level of quality: one …nds the numerator of d¹£=d£b to be equal to ¡1.
Summarizing, for £b higher than, but su¢ciently close to µ22, and for low values
of t, the average quality in the market can be decreased after the imposition of a
standard.
Furthermore, as a consequence of the quality adjustments one has that:
Proposition 3. If the regulator sets a standard £b such that µ¤1 > £b > µ
¤
2, the
welfare of the consumers that prior to the standard were purchasing the high quality
may be decreased, the welfare of the other consumers is increased. Total consumers’
welfare may decrease. As £b is raised, total consumers welfare increases are more
likely. Total welfare in the industry may also decrease.
That total consumers’ welfare may decrease can be proved as follows. Let u1(x;£b) =
v + µ1(£b) ¡ p1(£b) ¡ tx and u1(x;£b) = v + £b ¡ p2(£b) ¡ t(1 ¡ x). Then de…ne
U1(£b) =
R ~x
0
u1(x;£b)dx, and U2(£b) =
R 1
~x
u2(x;£b)dx as the welfare of consumers
purchasing good 1 and good 2 respectively. Then the derivative with respect to £b
of the sum Uc(£b) = U1(£b) + U1(£b) is equal to
(d~x(£b)=d£b)
"Z ~x(£b)
0
du1=d£bdx+
Z 1
~x(£b)
du2=d£bdx
#
;
or
dUc(£b)=d£b = 3=
h
2 (9t¡ 1)2
i
[3t~x(£b)¡ 6t+ 1] :
This derivative is increasing with £b and increasing in t, while it does not depend
upon ® because consumers’ welfare does not. It can be seen, by substituting for ~x(£b)
that dUc(£b)=d£b is negative if (9t) (9t ¡ £b ¡ (10=3)) + 2 > 0, an inequality that
holds for several parameter values, for instance take t = 1=4 and ® = 2, then µ¤1 = 5=9
and µ¤2 = 1=18. If the regulator sets £b halfway between these two values, namely if
£b = 11=36 then (9t) (9t¡ £b ¡ (10=3)) + 2 = :25 and it is positive, so that welfare
is decreasing in £b. Instead, if the regulator sets a high level of standard, then total
consumers welfare increases are more likely. Indeed, for £b = µ
¤
1 = 5=9 the derivative
has a strictly positive value.
That total welfare may decrease can be shown by taking again the case where
total consumers welfare is decreased, with t = 1=4, ® = 2 and £b taken to be
halfway between the two unregulated quality levels, namely £b = 11=36. Then,
if the sum of …rms pro…ts is decreased for this quality standard, total welfare is a
fortiori decreased. It turns out to be the case that the sum of pro…ts without the
standard is
¡
9t¡1
18
¢µ³
9®t¡2
9®t¡®¡1
´2
+ ®
³
9t¡2
9®t¡®¡1
´2¶
= (85=432). While the sum with
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the standard
[3t¡£]2
2(9t¡ 1) + (t=2)
h
1¡ 1¡3£9t¡1
i2
¡ ®£22 . When the standard is equal to
11=36 this is equal to 102110 800 , which is lower than 85=432. In general, the deriva-
tive of the sum of pro…ts with respect to the standard under regulation is equal to³
1
9t¡1
´h
3t
³
3£b¡1
9t¡1
´
+£b(1¡ ®)
i
, which can clearly be negative also for low values
of the standard.
These results contrast with previous results by Ronnen (1991) and Scarpa (1998),
since there all consumers gain from a standard. Furthermore, the result that average
quality may decrease is rather striking. This means that if there is some positive
externality associated with high quality, that the single consumer does not take into
account when making a purchase (like when one buys a car with a better airbag
system than average), the imposition of a MQS may lead to a deterioration in welfare
due to the externality.5
3.3. Innocuous standards
As for Case (c), one has that µ¤1 > µ
¤
2 > £. Let the level chosen by the regulator be
denoted as £c. Such a regulation may be introduced for reassuring public opinion,
or to make sure that if cost or demand conditions change, or if new entrants enter the
market, quality of any …rm does not fall below a given threshold. As the regulator
might be induced to think, a low level of quality standard should not interfere with
market outcome. This, however, is true only in the framework so far considered.
4. Consumers’ uncertainty about qualities
In the present section the scenario in which …rms compete shall be modi…ed to allow
for uncertainty. In order to keep the model as simple as possible it shall be assumed
that …rms and the regulator observe qualities without noise and that there is no un-
certainty in the determination of quality. By contrast, consumers are uncertain about
the success rate of products. This may be due to asymmetric information, so that
consumers are less informed than …rms and the regulator. Consumers can be thought
of receiving an imperfect signal about the quality of a product. Such a description
of consumers’ beliefs has been often invoked to model situations when they cannot
try the product before purchase or use, like in the consumption of pharmaceutical
drugs, or when the true enjoyment of the product characteristics comes by over time,
like with dietary products, some kind of electronic durables, tires or components in
vehicles, energy saving improvements in domestic appliances, and safety enhancing
devices.
We shall analyze, in turn, the case where only the improvement made by …rm
2 is uncertain and the case where both …rms’ improvements are uncertain. An im-
provement is uncertain when consumers believe that the true value of the parameter
µi of a product is distributed according to some distribution function F (µi) over a
5A similar point is raised in Moraga-Gonzalez and Padron-Fumero (2002), who study a model
of perfect vertical di¤erentiation, although the increase in the external e¤ect, there, is due to an
increase in total sales.
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nondegenerate support. The support can be an interval or a discrete set of points.
The main idea is most simply conveyed …rst by analyzing the case where consumers
are uncertain only about the product of one …rm (say …rm 2) and the support of the
distribution is the set of two points fµ0; µ2g. Consumers then attribute probability ¹
to the event that µ2 is the true value that the …rm actually has obtained and (1¡ ¹)
to the event that the value is µ0.
Since …rms and the regulator perfectly observe the improvement they know that
it will lead to a higher gross surplus for all concerned consumers. The model could be
adapted to allow for two-sided uncertainty, but the greater generality so acquired has
a cost in complexity and in interpretation. The model with one-sided uncertainty is
suited to re‡ect in a simple way the existence of some information asymmetry between
consumers and producers-regulators. Furthermore, as it shall become apparent, there
exists a causality running from the e¤ect of regulation on the consumers’ perceptions
of quality and the strategic interplay between …rms. This is the causality that we
want to isolate.
4.1. Uncertainty about quality of an entrant
Assume that consumers are risk neutral and that they are uncertain about the quality
of …rm 2’s product only. This would be a fair description of the case where …rm 2 is
a new entrant in a market, or a foreign …rm entering a domestic market. Consumers
assign probability (1¡¹) to the event that the gross utility they derive from consuming
good 2 is v+ µ0, where µ0 < µ2 is a quality level on which no restrictions are imposed
for the time being. Then the expected quality improvement from good 2 is denoted
E(µ2) = ¹µ2 + (1¡ ¹)µ0:
Before proceeding note the obvious fact that the …rst partial of E(µ2) with respect
to µ0 and ¹ have the same sign and are both positive: an increase in consumers’
con…dence can be represented by an increase in either one or both these variables.
The consumer indi¤erent between buying quality 1 or 2 is given by
~x =
1
2
+
(p2 ¡ p1) + (µ1 ¡E(µ2))
2t
;
and the demand and pro…t functions at the second stage can be accordingly rewritten.
De…ne for convenienceH ´ (3t)¡1(1¡¹)µ0. Then, at the …rst stage the pro…t function
of …rm 2 writes as
¼2 =
Ã
(3t¡ µ1 + ¹µ2 + 3tH)2
18t
¡ ®(µ2)
2
2
!
Taking the …rst derivative and setting it equal to zero gives the best reply of …rm
2 as:
µ2 = ¹
3t(1 +H)¡ µ1
9®t¡ ¹2 :
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As for the pro…t function of …rm 1 it is simply ¼1 =
n
[3t+ (µ1 ¡E(µ2))]2
o
=(18t)¡
(µ1)
2=2. So that the best reply function is the same as in the previous section, with
E(µ2) replacing µ2. Note that a change in E(µ2) will lead to a downward shift in the
reaction function of …rm 1. Then, letting 9t(9®t¡ ¹2 ¡ ®)¡ ¹(1¡ ¹) ´ Á one has:
µ¤1 = (3t=Á) [9®t¡ ¹(1 + ¹+H)] ;
and
µ¤2 =
¹(3t+ 3tH)
9t®¡ ¹2 ¡
3t
9t®¡ ¹2 µ
¤
1:
To study the impact of a minimum quality standard, suppose that the government
chooses a level £ such that µ0 < £ < µ
¤
2 obtains. Then it is possible to state the
following:
Proposition 1. If consumers are uncertain only about the quality of product 2 and
the MQS is such that the standard is lower than the lowest quality in the unregulated
equilibrium, then both equilibrium qualities are a¤ected by the presence of regulation.
In particular, the higher quality will be decreased and the lower quality increased.
Proof: In this simple case, if £ > µ0, the support of the distribution representing
consumers’ beliefs is changed from the set fµ0; µ2g to the set f£; µ2g. To study the
impact of the standard, note that the derivative of µ¤1 with respect to H is equal to
the derivative with respect to µ0 (or £) multiplied by (1¡¹)=(3t), and therefore both
have the same sign. This derivative is: dµ¤1=dH = ¡(3t¹)=Á, which is easy to sign
as negative given the assumption that t > 2=9. Then, since qualities are strategic
substitutes, if µ¤1 decreases with H then µ
¤
2 will increase.
Both qualities are changed and in the same direction as in the case (b) with cer-
tainty analyzed above, where the standard is intermediate between the two qualities.
The apparently ”innocuous” standard works by modifying the consumers’ perceptions
of …rm 2’s quality. This, in turn, shifts down the best reply function of …rm 1, since
for any true quality chosen by the rival, the perceived quality by consumers is higher
with the standard than without it. The changes in the equilibrium quality values are
then obvious.
One may notice also that the same type of change can be obtained through reg-
ulations that improve the value of ¹, that can represent a measure of the level of
consumers’ con…dence in the product.
4.2. Symmetric uncertainty
The case where consumers’ beliefs about the quality of both …rms are symmetric can
be built on the results so far obtained and it reveals again the striking feature of the
e¤ect of a MQS that is lower than the equilibrium value of qualities in an unregulated
set up. The direction of the changes in actual qualities is not uniquely determined,
14
however, and not general, as it can be easily seen by noting that if, under symmetry
of beliefs E(µ1) = ¹µ1 + (1¡ ¹)µ0 then E(µ1)¡E(µ2) = ¹(µ1 ¡ µ2): then at the …rst
stage of the game one has that ¼2 =
h
(3t¡ ¹(µ1 ¡ µ2))2
i
=(18t)¡ (®=2) (µ2)2. This
pro…t function, as well as that for …rm 1, is independent of the lower bound of the
distribution support, µ0, and the impact of a MQS that is lower than the unregulated
qualities is nihil. However, for di¤erent distribution functions of beliefs the non-
neutrality of an apparently innocuous standard is obtained again, although the e¤ect
on qualities is di¢cult to predict in general.
To simplify, assume that …rms are cost-symmetric, namely ® = 1.
In order to understand the source of the di¢culties in signing the e¤ects of a
standard, take the case where the value of µi is believed to belong to the interval of
values [h0; ti], where h0 can be any real number and ti ¸ µi, so that the interval always
contains the true value for µi. Then, application of a standard at a level, say, h > h0
implies that the expected value for µi is modi…ed to E(µi j h) =
R ti
h
³
x
1¡Fi(h)
´
fi(x)dx,
where fi(:) is the density of µi over [h0; ti] and, as the support for the two qualities
may be di¤erent, even if the distributions for the two …rms have the same form they
will take di¤erent values. In general, the expected value of the quality di¤erence
E(µ1)¡E(µ2) depends upon the lower bounds of the supports of the two distributions.
The e¤ect of the amelioration of the consumers’ beliefs on the di¤erence E(µ1)¡
E (µ2), cannot be signed without reference to speci…c examples. Since it is this dif-
ference that enters the expression for the pro…t functions of the two …rms the e¤ect
on equilibrium qualities cannot be signed in general either. Indeed it can be either
positive or negative.
It is then possible to state the following:
Proposition 2. If …rms’ costs are symmetric (namely if ® = 1) and consumers’
uncertainty about the two products is symmetric, a standard below the quality of
both …rms may lead to a change in both quality levels. The change may be an
increase or a decrease.
Proof: Since E(µ1)¡E (µ2) enters the pro…t functions of both …rms and since the
…rst derivative of E(µ1 j h)¡ E(µ2 j h) can take zero values only in particular cases,
the best reply functions of both …rms shall be a¤ected by an increase in h.
As an example consider the case with a discrete support for both qualities. Namely
assume that µi is a priori believed to take with equal probability three possible values,
¡¯µi; µi; ¸µi, with ¯ > 0, ¸ > 1 (the improvement may be negative in the eyes of
consumers).
Then, suppose the standard is such that h = 0, or that the regulation prevents
selling a quality with negative µi. The expected quality without a standard for …rm i is
(1=3)(1+¸¡¯)µi while with the standard the quality is expected to be (1=3)(1+¸) µi.
Letting zu = (1=3)(1+¸¡¯)and z(h) = (1=3)(1+¸) one has thatE (µ1 j ¹)¡E(µ2 j ¹)
reduces to the expression z(h)(µ1 ¡ µ2). One can then calculate the equilibrium
qualities as
µ¤(z) = 3tz
µ
9t¡ z ¡ z2
z4 ¡ 18z2t+ 81t2 ¡ z3
¶
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and check, for instance for the case ¸ = ¯ = 4=3, then when z = z(h) the equilibrium
qualities are higher with the standard than they are for z = zu.
The proposition shows that under asymmetric information the imposition of an
innocuous standard may not be innocuous indeed. Similarly, eliminating an MQS
policy because …rms have been complying with it may not be innocuous either, as
consumers expectations may change and equilibrium qualities also.
5. Conclusion and discussion
The theoretical underpinning of policy intervention on product quality through qual-
ity standards seems, to date, to be rather weak. Spence (1975) had already shown
that a monopoly can produce a quality level that can be lower or higher than the so-
cially optimal level. according to this result, without knowledge of the way in which
the demand function is a¤ected by quality improvements it is impossible to determine
if a minimum quality standard is desirable or not in case of a monopoly. In the case
of oligopolistic rivalry, the determination of equilibrium qualities is …rst studied in
the pure vertical di¤erentiation model of Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) that obtains
the result that one of the two …rms in a duopoly always selects the lowest possible
quality. Whether this result is believed to be special or general, it raises the problem,
again, of regulatory intervention. The results by Ronnen (1991) have been discussed
in the Introduction above. The possibility of welfare improvements and therefore of
a justi…cation for imposition of MQS is the main achievement for practical purposes
of that paper. However, MQS can have adverse e¤ect on …rms’ pro…ts and, therefore,
on total welfare (as also Scarpa (1998) has also pointed out for a market with three
…rms). In the present paper, abandoning the hypothesis that the products are di¤er-
entiated only in the vertical dimension and allowing for both, vertical and horizontal
di¤erentiation, I have shown that under perfect information the imposition of an MQS
can lead to welfare gain or to losses for consumers, for …rms, and for the industry as
well. Again, therefore, the application of an MQS is di¢cult to justify in general in
context of this kind.
It seems worthwhile noting at this point how, so far, the discussion on MQS policy
in oligopoly has been cast in terms of models with perfect information. However, as
casual observation reveals, the political debate moves upon the hypothesis that some
market failure may occur, either due to imperfect information or due to external
e¤ects like, for instance, polluting emissions. I have not considered here the existence
of externalities, but I have introduced imperfect information. I have shown how that,
when consumers are less informed than …rms and the regulator about the products’
qualities, the imposition of an MQS can push …rms to increase their quality levels.
This is true even for MQS that set standards below both the quality levels at an
unregulated equilibrium. Rather surprisingly, innocuous standards turn out to be not
innocuous indeed. The basic intuition is easily gained in the case where consumers
are uncertain only about the quality level of one …rm, like in the case of a new entrant.
There, the imposition of an MQS cuts the lower tail of the support for the distribution
representing consumers’ expectations about this quality level. The result is that the
expected quality of the entrant is, for any level of quality actually chosen, higher with
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the MQS than without it. This changes the equilibrium quality of the …rm that is
not subject to uncertainty as well. In this case, again, the level of the high quality is
lowered and that of the low quality raised at equilibrium when a standard is imposed.
The welfare consequences for this case, therefore, replicate those of the case under
perfect information, leading again to the conclusion that MQS can have positive or
negative e¤ects on welfare.
Finally, however, some vindication for the use of MQSmay come out of the analysis
of the case where consumers are uncertain about the qualities of both …rms, although
one has to be prudent in this case also. It is easy to see that the consumers’ perceptions
about both qualities may be changed and equilibrium qualities raised by a standard
that is set below the unregulated quality levels. Not only an innocuous MQS is not
innocuous, but it may be bene…cial to all consumers. Unfortunately however, this
result is not general either, as one can produce examples where the standard has
adverse e¤ects on the quality levels produced at equilibrium.
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